Water conflict between india and pakistan pdf
File Name: water conflict between india and pakistan .zip
- Water wars: Are India and Pakistan heading for climate change-induced conflict?
- A Look into the Conflict Between India and Pakistan over Kashmir
- Hydropolitics in the Indus Basin: The Indus Water Treaty & Water Mismanagement in Pakistan
Legal and political considerations make flouting the Indus Water Treaty easier said than done. Besides using the abrogation of Article during campaigns for the recently-concluded assembly elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi furthered his nationalist rhetoric, promising the Haryana electorate that he would stop the flow of the Indus River into Pakistan, and instead redirect its waters into the state. Tensions between the two neighbours have become increasingly strained since the decision to split Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories—diplomatic ties have been downgraded, foreign envoys have been sent back, and bilateral trade has also reduced. However, this is not the first instance that the Indus Water Treaty IWT has been threatened during times of increased tension.
Water wars: Are India and Pakistan heading for climate change-induced conflict?
Legal and political considerations make flouting the Indus Water Treaty easier said than done. Besides using the abrogation of Article during campaigns for the recently-concluded assembly elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi furthered his nationalist rhetoric, promising the Haryana electorate that he would stop the flow of the Indus River into Pakistan, and instead redirect its waters into the state.
Tensions between the two neighbours have become increasingly strained since the decision to split Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories—diplomatic ties have been downgraded, foreign envoys have been sent back, and bilateral trade has also reduced.
However, this is not the first instance that the Indus Water Treaty IWT has been threatened during times of increased tension. Through this reading list, we provide a historical background to the IWT, examine if it has successfully mediated conflicts arising due to water security, and also investigate the legal implications of India attempting to exit the treaty. When undivided India was partitioned in , the Indus river system was effectively cut into two. Ramaswamy R Iyer writes that at the time, it was necessary to develop irrigation networks in western Punjab, now a part of Pakistan.
Thus, the two governments decided that Pakistan would have access to the Jhelum, Chenab and the Indus itself, while India would use water from the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers. Certain restrictions were placed on India as the upper riparian. On the rivers allocated to Pakistan, India was not allowed to build storages. Restrictions were also imposed on the extension of irrigation development in India On Pakistan, the lower riparian, there were some relatively less significant restrictions.
There were also provisions regarding the exchange of data on project operation, extent of irrigated agriculture, and so on. The Treaty further mandated certain institutional arrangements: there was to be a permanent Indus Commission consisting of a Commissioner each for India and for Pakistan, and there were to be periodical meetings and exchanges of visits. Provisions were included for conflict-resolution: differences, if any arose, were to be resolved within the Commission; if agreement could not be reached at the Commission level, the dispute was to be referred to the two governments; if they too failed to reach agreement, the Treaty provided an arbitration mechanism.
The settlement also included the provision of international financial assistance to Pakistan for the development of irrigation works for utilising the waters allocated to it, and India too paid a sum of approximately Pounds Sterling The gates to which Pakistan is objecting are part of any hydroelectric project.
The removal of gates would mean the end of the BHPP. The Indian position is that the security fears are misconceived, as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself first.
Even though negotiations with Pakistan were ongoing, and a neutral expert from the World Bank was called to mediate, India went ahead with the construction of the dam. Pavan Nair says that this was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the IWT.
While accepting some of the points in favour of India, the neutral expert raised the intake point for the turbines by three metres and reduced the freeboard by one metre. Though these may be considered minor changes, the implication was that the Indian design was aiming to impound more water than what was permitted by the IWT.
The mechanism of the IWT was, thus, ineffective in resolving the issues raised by Pakistan, one of the signatories, to its satisfaction. While the IWT is unique for deciding upon water-sharing on the basis of location rather than quantity of water, this could prove to be problematic in the future.
Location does not constitute a total geography of a river—the relationship between river and society is contingent upon much more. Population growth, advances in technology and climate change are just three dynamic factors shaping this geography. Put another way, the law operates autonomously from the social situation that produces and interprets it. Further, Akhter writes that the idea that technology can solve sociopolitical conflicts is flawed.
Within the context of Kashmir, Akhter argues that resolutions arrived at via the IWT can only defer the possibility of future conflict, not eliminate it. The important questions about the Indus waters are not about how the Pakistani state is crafty or the Indian state is a bully—although these are important if here crudely stated geopolitical considerations.
What about the people of greater Kashmir? While Pakistan and India rush to build dams in the region, people who live there continue to see their land cynically territorialised by Pakistan and India. Are we to believe that one of the most heavily militarised regions in the world will benefit in a democratic and equitable way from dam construction? Asma Yaqoob argues that exiting the IWT is easier said than done. A unilateral withdrawal would not sit well with China and Nepal, with whom India is a recipient of water sharing treaties.
There have been discussions in the regional and international mass media over the issue, but a more candid analysis rely on the proof of history that the Indian government is only involved in using threats and pressures to bow down Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Real abrogation is not an easy step, and India is well aware of the political implications of such a move. It would attract a lot of criticism from world powers, besides weakening Indian position in relation to other riparian states in the region.
Further, Yaqoob contends that any attempt to block water or divert water from Pakistan would run foul of international law. An analysis of some of the relevant articles sums up an interesting deduction.
Invoking Article 46 means that India would have to provide adequate justification, if any, of the IWT provisions that violate its internal law of fundamental importance.
Question could be raised over any Indian attempt to use this ground that why India has been planning and utilising water works under the same provisions for more than five decades if a violation was manifest in application of her significant internal laws. Further, Iyer writes that it is unrealistic to assume that India could have the institutional capacity to store water from the Indus.
We could have proceeded with the building of storages on the western rivers. But such projects take years 10 or even 15 to build. The waters of these mighty rivers cannot be stopped or diverted instantly. No immediate punishment of Pakistan would have been possible. We could of course have used old existing structures to retain or divert waters, but only a limited and temporary hardship could have been inflicted on Pakistan through these means.
Beyond a point we would have created problems for ourselves by the retention of the waters. We cannot erect instant barriers across the three western rivers; they will continue to flow into Pakistan. Even the eastern rivers allocated to India flow into Pakistan and then into the Arabian Sea as parts of the Indus system. It follows that the abrogation of the Treaty by India, while securing for India a great deal of international opprobrium, would not have been a potent weapon in our hands.
View the discussion thread. Skip to main content. Must Read. Feminism in the Last Decade: An Interactive. Building Blocks of Brahmanical Patriarchy. The Price of Development. Do water policies recognise the differential requirements and usages of water by women and the importance of adequate availability and accessibility? Personal Laws in India present a situation where abolishing them in the interest of gender justice also inadvertently benefits the reactionary side.
Concerns have been raised about criminalising triple talaq now that the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Marriage Bill, has been passed as an ordinance. This reading list is to help Advertisement Tariffs. Connect with us Contact Us.
A Look into the Conflict Between India and Pakistan over Kashmir
Access options available:. These wars and conflicts were the outcome of unlimited desires of mankind to conquer and control the natural resources. Water remained one of these natural resources which caused a number of wars. Most of the great civilizations emerged and flourished around the great rivers like Sindh, Euphrates, Nile and Ganges etc. Water, which once was used for irrigation and domestic purpose only, with the passage of time, has become a very important component of industrial growth in the modern world. Production of different commodities requires the consumption of water also.
Hydropolitics in the Indus Basin: The Indus Water Treaty & Water Mismanagement in Pakistan